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Abstract—There have been several public demon-
strations of attacks on connected vehicles showing the
ability of an attacker to take control of a targeted
vehicle by injecting messages into their Controller Area
Network (CAN) bus. In this paper, using injected speed
reading and Revolutions Per Minute (RPM) reading
messages in in-motion vehicle, we examine the ability of
the Pearson correlation and the unsupervised learning
methods k-means clustering and HiddenMarkovModel
(HMM) to differentiate ’no-attack’ and ’under-attack’
states of the given vehicle. We found that the Pearson
correlation distinguishes the two states, the k-means
clustering method has an acceptable accuracy but high
false positive rate and HMM detects attacks with
acceptable detection rate but has a high false positive
in detecting attacks from speed readings when there is
no attack. The accuracy of these unsupervised learning
methods are comparable to the ones of the supervised
learning methods used by CAN bus Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) suppliers. In addition, the paper shows
that studying CAN anomaly detection techniques using
off-vehicle test facilities may not properly evaluate the
performance of the detection techniques. The results
suggest using other features besides the data content
of the CAN messages and integrate knowledge about
how the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) collaborate
in building effective techniques for the detection of
injection of fabricated message attacks.
I. Introduction
On newer vehicles, Electronic Control Units (ECUs)
communicate using in-vehicle networks to control their
behaviors, as shown in Figure 1. For example, the figure
shows that the engine control unit communicates with
other controllers such as the odometer and brakes over
the Controller Area Network (CAN) [1], among other bus
systems. Normal and safety critical communications occur
in this manner.
In addition to the above, several Intelligent Transporta-
tion Systems (ITSs) applications have been proposed and
implemented in recent years to improve drivers experiences
and road safety. Examples of these applications include
infotainment systems, fleet management systems, park-
ing assistance, remote diagnostics, eCall, remote engine
start, and Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC)
systems [2], [3], [4]. In order to operate correctly, these
Fig. 1: Example of connected vehicle [2].
ITSs must communicate frequently using the CAN bus
to exchange messages between the ECUs, sensors and
applications.
The CAN was designed to operate as a closed net-
work systems, that is, all the communicating nodes are
trusted [2]. The CAN does not support security mech-
anisms, such as authentication, to identify and isolate
malicious nodes. This design was not a problem when
automobiles were standalone entities, however, today, ITS
applications communicate with external entities, such as
other vehicles in the case of CACC. This makes it pos-
sible for the attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in these
applications and to attack the connected vehicles.
Many studies in the last decade showed the feasibility
of cyber-attacks on connected vehicles. Zhao [5], Wolf et
al. [6], and Hoppe et al. [7] were among the pioneers in
identifying and discussing attacks on connected vehicles.
Koscher et. al. demonstrated the feasibility of such at-
tacks [8] such as unlocking doors and controlling the lights,
horn, and wipers of a vehicle. In addition, Checkoway et
al. [9] experimented with a set of attack vectors including
CD players, Bluetooth, and radio. Valasek and Miller
demonstrated the ability to remotely take control of a
new Jeep Cherokee by accessing the vehicle’s steering,
brakes, and transmission at DEFCON [10]. Other demon-
strations of remote attacks on connected vehicles included
the attacks on a Chrysler vehicle [11] and the attack
on a Tesla X [12]. Recently, automotive manufacturers,
such as Toyota, began planning to equip new models
with Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) devices [13], providing new
attack vectors for attackers [14]. These demonstrations
and events attracted significant news coverage, raising
awareness of and concern over the issue. By 2015; 78%
of car-buyers believe that vehicles could be hacked [15].
Security researchers believe these attacks, once confined
to controlled environments, are now available for use by
malicious actors [16].
The community has proposed several prevention and
detection solutions to address cyber security threats to
connected vehicles. The preventive solutions typically re-
quire the modification of the CAN protocol, an impracti-
cality for used and new automobiles [2], [3]. The detection-
based solutions (or IDS), e.g., [7], [17], [18], [19], often
use artificial data, e.g., [20],1 data collected from simula-
tors [21], or data related to researchers’ devices to detect
malicious behaviors, e.g., [22], which limits the practicality
of the results. In addition, most of the anomaly-based
IDSs use supervised learning techniques, such as neural-
network-based techniques [23]. The learning phase of these
techniques requires the use of large dataset and extensive
time to develop high-performance IDS models from labeled
data [24].2 Note that the profiles are already specific for
every vehicle make and model; they are dependent on
vehicle systems’ features [24].
We explore in this paper the capabilities of unsupervised
machine learning methods to detect injection-attacks of
CAN messages using data collected from an in-motion
vehicle. Unsupervised techniques do not require extensive
time to develop detection models from labeled data and
may not depend on the context of the data, such as the
make and model of the vehicle and the driving behavior of
the driver. We choose in this evaluation the Pearson cor-
relation because it is commonly used to explore the data.
We choose k-means clustering and Hidden Markov Model
(HMM) because they are commonly used unsupervised
learning methods and were with excellent results [22].
We focus in this study on vehicle’s speed and RPM
readings because (1) it is easy to observe the physical
effects of injecting speed and RPM readings (the pointers
of the speedometer and tachometer move to indicate the
injected values) and (2) they are safe to inject while
the vehicle is in-motion; changing them do not harm the
driver if aware about that–the pointers of the speedometer
and tachometer move to indicate the injected values.
(Manipulating speed and RPM readings in conjunction
with using vehicle features that use these readings, such as
cruise control is not safe.) To detect the message injection
attacks, we distinguish two states: no-attack, no injection
of speed or RPM reading messages, and under-attack,
fabricated speed or RPM reading messages are injected.
We aim to identify the state of the vehicle from the data
exchanged on the in-vehicle network.
1The researchers log the messages exchanged between the ECUs
in a normally operating vehicle. Then, they inject randomly a set of
fabricated messages in the dataset.
2Each record is flagged as related to attack or no-attack states.
The main contributions of the paper are:
1) Capture of the messages log of the CAN bus for (1)
normal driving behavior, (2) injection of fabricated
speed reading messages onto the CAN bus, and (3)
injection of fabricated RPM reading messages onto
the CAN bus of an in-motion Ford Transit 500 2017.
2) Evaluate the performance of (1) Pearson correla-
tion [25], (2) k-means clustering [26], and (3) Hidden
Markov Models [27] to detect injection of speed and
RPM readings attacks using datasets collected from
an in-motion vehicle. Note that k-means and HMM
clustering are commonly used unsupervised learning
methods.
3) Show that studying CAN anomaly detection tech-
niques using off-vehicle test facilities may not prop-
erly evaluate the performance of the detection tech-
niques.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we give a primer
on CAN in Section II and discuss the threat model in
Section III. Then, we discuss related work in Section IV.
Next, we describe the experiment setup and the collected
data in Section V. We discuss the application of the
detection techniques and the obtained results in Section VI
afterwords. Then, we discuss the results along with their
impacts and limitations in Section VII and conclude the
paper in Section VIII.
II. Background - Primer on CAN protocol
The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a serial commu-
nication protocol supporting real-time control with high-
levels of safety. It was developed by Robert Bosch and
officially released at the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) conference in Detroit, Michigan in 1986 [1]. The
protocol is used by the On-Board Diagnostics (OBD) stan-
dard, which is mandatory for all cars and light trucks sold
in the United States since 1996 and in the European Union
since 2004. In the remainder of this section, we discuss
the format of the OBD message frame, the arbitration
mechanism used, and the OBD-II standard.
A. Message format
The CAN is a time-synchronized broadcast, multi-cast
reception bus that uses two wires to connect ECUs to-
gether. One wire is the CAN high (aka CANH) and the
other wire is the CAN low (CANL). There are four types
of message frames exchanged on the CAN bus: (1) Data
Frame, a frame used to exchange data between the nodes,
(2) Remote Frame, a frame requesting the transmission of
a specific identifier, (3) Error Frame, a frame transmitted
by any node detecting an error, and (4) Overload Frame, a
frame to inject a delay between data or remote frames [1].
The data frame, which is used in this study, is composed of
seven fields: (1) Start of Frame, which indicates the start of
a frame, (2) Arbitration field, which includes the Identifier
of the message (stored in the Identifier field) and service
bits, (3) Control field, which includes the length of the data
2
Fig. 2: OBD pin-out diagram [29]
TABLE I: OBD-II Pin Specification
Pin Function Pin Function
1 Manufacture Specific 9 Manufacture Specific
2 J1850 Bus (+) 10 J1850 Bus (-)
3 Manufacturer Specific 11 Manufacturer Specific
4 Ground 12 Manufacturer Specific
5 Ground 13 Manufacturer Specific
6 CAN High 14 CAN Low
7 K-Line (ISO 9141-2) 15 L-Line (ISO 9141-2)
8 Manufacturer Specific 16 12V Battery Power
contained in the message and two reserved bits, (4) Data
field, which is of 0 to 8 bytes and includes the data to be
transferred, (5) CRC field, which is used to identify errors,
(6) ACK field, which is used to acknowledge receiving the
message and (7) End of Frame, which is a seven recessive
(value 1) bits that indicate the end of the frame [1].
B. Arbitration
Transmission on the CAN bus follows the Carrier Sense
Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD)
protocol [28] where any network node can start trans-
mitting whenever the bus is free [1]. If two nodes (or
more) start transmitting at the same time, the conflict is
resolved by bit-wise arbitration of the node’s Identifiers.
As a result, the identifier is also called the Priority ID.
Nodes detect collisions by comparing the transmitted bits
to the monitored bit. The node continues the transmission
if the bits are equal, else a collision is detected. The ECU
that sends the message with the lowest Identifier wins the
arbitration and begins to re-transmit the message. Note
that recent vehicles ignore messages with identifier of "0",
the highest priority identifier, based on experiments that
we conducted on several 2017 vehicles.
C. On-Board Diagnostics (OBD)
On-Board Diagnostics (OBD) is implemented in the
vehicles to provide ways to report self-diagnosed errors
and malfunctions [29]. The SAE introduced a standardized
diagnostic port connector and a set of protocols for OBD
in 1988. By 1996, OBD-II was mandated nationwide in the
United States.
The OBD-II standard specifies the connector type and
its pin-outs, signaling protocols, and the format of the mes-
sages. Figure 2 shows the connector and Table I provides
the pin specification.
All cars manufactured in USA after 2008 support the
Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol and offer a
means to interface with it through the OBD-II port, which
is usually located under the steering wheel. This port
gives direct access to the CAN network. We used in our
experiment the OBD-II port to collect data from the CAN
bus–see Section V. Specifically, we used pin 6 and pin 14
of the Connector. Pin 6 carries CAN High at 3.75 V and
Pin 14 carries CAN Low at 1.25 V.
III. Threat Model
Although claimed to be a secure protocol by its Creator,
the CAN protocol is acknowledged to be insecure3 [30],
[10]. It was designed to be a closed network system [2].
The security weaknesses include [31]:
• Lack of segmentation and boundary defense: The
ECUs of a vehicle are often organized in sections,
however, all sections of the bus are connected through
gateways. Thus, an intruder, for example, may gain
access to the Anti-Braking System through the info-
tainment system.
• Lack of device authentication: Data broadcasted by a
CAN node reaches all nodes in the network, with no
authentication of the sender node, that is, any node
connected to the network can send any CAN identifier
it wishes. In addition, any device can participate in
the network communications solely by connecting to
the bus.
• Un-encrypted traffic: Messages exchanged between
the nodes of a CAN are plain-text; they are not
considered confidential.
• Availability check: The CAN network checks for the
availability of the carrier before every message is sent.
If the carrier is busy, all the ECUs are halted and the
carrier is rechecked after a period. This mechanism
can be used by attackers to carryout Denial Of Service
(DOS) attacks.
Accesses to the CAN of a vehicle could be local or
remote [32], [9], [2]. Local attacks can be initiated through,
for example, the Passive Anti-Theft System (PATS), Tire
Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS), Remote Keyless
Entry / Start (RKE), Bluetooth, and OBD connector [32].
The attack surface for remote access includes Radio Data
System, Telematics, Cellular, and WiFi [9], [2], [32]. Info-
tainment systems are among the main entry points [33].
We used in our experiment the OBD-II port as it gives
direct physical access to the CAN network. We injected
fabricated speed and RPM readings messages [19] into
the bus. The port has been used previously to inject
messages into the CAN bus of vehicles [10], [19]. Injection
of fabricated speed and RPM messages can trick the driver
and autonomous driving systems (if they use the speed
3Robert Bosch claims in [1] that the protocol "supports distributed
real-time control with a very high level of security." This is a merely
an incorrect translation in our opinion. The German term "sicherheit"
means both security and safety, as in other languages such as French
and Arabic.
3
Fig. 3: OBD-II port.
reading in their decisions making) and may lead to wrong
decisions.
The paper proposes a set of IDS techniques to detect
injection of speed and RPM readings messages into the
CAN bus, which are Pearson correlation, K-means, and
HMM. IDSs are commonly used as a protection control to
mitigate injection of messages into in-vehicle networks [34].
Potential attackers need to bypass the IDS, if installed on
the in-vehicle network of a vehicle, to be able to inject
successfully speed or RPM readings messages.
IV. Related Work
This section discusses related work on attack prevention
and attack detection methods.
A. Automobile attacks and prevention techniques
The absence of an authentication mechanism in the
CAN protocol is the main root cause of most of the
reported attacks. Several authentication protocols were
proposed to address this weakness. For example, Groza
et al. [35] proposed CAN Auth, a protocol that uses a 15-
byte pre-shared key to authenticate transmitted messages.
The protocol also uses a counter to prevent replay attacks.
Other solutions include the Light Weight CAN Authenti-
cation Protocol (LCAP) [36], the Light Weight Broadcast
Authentication CAN Protocol (LiBrA CAN) [35], and
the CAN ID shuffling using the network address shuffling
technique [37]. Like most prevention solution, these solu-
tions require vehicle modifications to support the proposed
modified CAN protocols.
B. Attack detection and mitigation
Several anomaly-based solutions to detect attacks on
the in-vehicle network have been proposed. For example,
Müter et al. [17] proposed logical sensors that use the
network protocol specifications, the redundancy of data
sources, and the cooperation mechanisms of the devices to
detect attacks on the CAN bus. Although this technique
does not produce false positives as it uses unambiguous
and reliable information, it does produce high false neg-
atives as a result of errors caused by faulty hardware.
Müter et al [18] also proposed the use of a coincidence
metric, which is the relative entropy of the CAN messages
when there is no-attack versus when there is an attack.
The metric has a low value when there is no-attack and
high value when there are attacks–due to repetition of
messages. The technique fails, however, to detect attacks
when the data values used in the attack deviate slightly
from the legitimate values. In addition, it is difficult to
identify a threshold to distinguish a legitimate state from
attack state.
Several Machine Learning (ML)-based attack detection
techniques have been proposed. For instance, Taylor et
al. [20] proposed the use of Long Short Term Memory
(LSTM) networks to detect attacks on the CAN bus. The
authors collected CAN bus data from the normal operation
of a 2012 Subaru Impreza and injected fabricated messages
into the dataset to ’mimic’ attacks. Then, they trained a
detection model to predict the next data byte originating
from each of the ECUs, such that deviations from the
model are declared attacks. The model detects anomalies
with very low false positive rates. Also, Levi et al. [21]
proposed a system for monitoring the different vehicle’s
interfaces, extracting relevant information, and sending
the data to a trained generative model to detect devia-
tions from the normal behavior. The system uses HMM
to generate the model of normal vehicle behavior and
a regression model to calibrate the likelihood threshold
of anomalies. Cho and Shin proposed Clock-based IDS
(CIDS) [19], an anomaly-based intrusion detection system
that fingerprints ECUs based upon their periodic in-
vehicle messages. CIDS detects attacks and identifies their
sources by identifying deviations in these fingerprints. The
technique does not, however, work for ECUs that send
aperiodic messages.
Lokman et al. [23] surveyed the literature of
intrusion detection methods and classified them into
anomaly-based, frequency-based, machine learning-based,
statistical-based, specification,-based, signature-based,
and hybrid-based methods. They found that most of the
methods achieved high accuracy, require labeled data,
and focus on detecting attacks from periodic malicious
messages.
Tomlinson et al. [22] surveyed also the literature of
intrusion detection methods for the CAN bus and an-
alyzed their practicalities. They classified the meth-
ods into signature-based, statistical, knowledge-based,
clustering-based, Neural network-based, and HMM-based
approaches. The authors found that the surveyed studies
typically used fabricated data by manipulating the CAN
logs collected from vehicles or simulators, e.g, [21]. Tomlin-
son et al. identified several problems with these methods to
include: the fabricated dataset typically does not account
4
for the response and feedback of ECUs/fault detection
mechanisms within the vehicle, as well as an unrealistic
expectation that the simulators will faithfully replicate the
true behavior of the vehicles.4 The results are, therefore,
"might be less realistic" [22]. To address these identified
shortfalls, we use an actual in-motion vehicle to perform
our experiments.
Seo at al. proposed an IDS for in-vehicle networks that
uses convolution neural network and generative adversarial
nets [38] to identify injection attacks in CAN bus. The
model encodes the CAN IDs of the messages captured
from the attacked vehicle to one-hot-vector, which allows
to use the CAN messages as images. The authors evaluated
their technique using data captured from a parked Hyndai
TF Sonata; they generated five Neural Network models,
each detects one of the following attacks: Denial of Service
(DoS), injection of fuzzy messages, injection of RPM mes-
sages, and injection of GEAR messages. The five models
have high attack detection rates (and also high precision
and accuracy) on the attacks that are trained on. The
technique requires training a model for each attack type.
In addition, the dataset used in the study are collected
from a parked vehicle, which limits the scope of the study
results because when parked, only a small subset of the
ECU of the test vehicle inject messages into the CAN bus
and the frequencies of sending messages of these ECUs is
constant.
Iegotov and Fischmeister [39] proposed a technique
to mine a task precedence graph from the trace of the
messages exchanged in the CAN bus and an anomaly
detection algorithm that checks the conformance of the
CAN messages received from the vehicle to the patterns
of the mined task precedence graph. The assessment of
the techniques using Seo et al.’s dataset [38] revealed that
the technique falsely detects anomalies. The techniques
detect false anomalies when the attacking device tries to
send spoofed messages because it changes the message
periods of some devices. This issue may indicate that
the performance of the techniques would degrade when
using in-motion vehicles because there will be devices with
noncyclic frequencies of sending messages.
Boumiza and Braham investigated the capability of
HMM to detect anomaly [40]. They also used Seo et
al.’s dataset [38], which limits the scope of the results as
specified earlier.
Hanselmann et al. [41] proposed a supervised Neu-
ral Network(NN)-based intrusion detection technique for
high-dimensional CAN bus. The system trains the NN
from the data of 20 signals managed by 13 CAN-bus
devices and identifies flooding attacks (attacks that send
messages of a particular ID with high frequency to the
CAN Bus), suppression attacks (the device is prevented
from sending messages) and payload modification attacks
4Simulators execute predefined models designed by their authors
and focus on a set of specific aspects of the real word behavior.
Fig. 4: Raspberry PI and PiCAN board connection to the
OBD-II port.
(changing the content of CAN messages). The technique
has a good performance for three of the attacks.
Stachowski et al. [24] developed a test suite to assess the
performance of IDSs to recognize messages that deviate
from the normal cyclic messages rate, track messages
that contain counters, rationalize messages content from
system wide status, detect violations of Bus Off timer,
distinguish anomalous messages from similar messages
invoked by common driving scenarios, and distinguish
anomalous messages from similar messages invoked by
unusual but non-anomalous driving behaviors. The au-
thors tested three IDSs–which were developed by three
suppliers–on three different vehicles in stationary and in-
motion scenarios. The IDSs have varying performance
results. For instance, the accuracy of the three IDS varies
between 50% and 100% in detecting violations of (not
specified) cyclic messages. In addition, two of the three
systems reported high-false positives (between 12% and
71%) in detecting anomalous events, when there is no
attacks.
V. Experiment setup and data collection
This section discusses the setup of our experiments,
specifically the devices used, the data collection methods
employed, and the datasets collected.
A. Experiment setup
Figure 4 shows the CAN node, composed of a Raspberry
PI 3 [42] and a PiCAN board [43], that we connected to the
OBD-II port [29] of our vehicle.5 The PiCAN connects to
the CAN network through a DB-9 connector to the CAN
H and CAN L pins. The DB 9/OBD II adapter puts the
CAN H pin (OBD-II pin 6) into DB9 pin 3 and the CAN
L pin (OBD-II pin 14) into DB9 pin 5.
5Recall that the OBD-II port provides physical access to the
vehicle CAN bus.
5
Fig. 5: Example of collected CAN data stream.
Sniff and log in-vehicle 
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Fig. 6: Flowchart of the process of identifying the PID of
the ECU of interest.
We used for this experiment Canutils tool-chain [44]
and SocketCAN [45]. The Canutils tool-chain can be
cloned from GitHub [46] and installed on the Raspberry
Pi. SocketCAN is an open-source driver package inte-
grated into the Linux networking stack. The tool-chain
includes additional tools to sniff the CAN network, moni-
tor changes, and inject CAN messages.
B. Collection of CAN Datasets
This subsection describes the collection of CAN data,
identification of the PID of the ECUs of interest: the
Tachometer and Speedometer, and transformation of the
data to human readable values.
Data collection. We monitor the traffic using our data
collection devices and archive the CAN messages that the
vehicle’s ECUs exchange. Figure 5 shows an example of
data collected from the CAN bus. Each row of the data
corresponds to a message broadcasted by an ECU on the
CAN bus. The three hexadecimal digits after the term
Fig. 7: Injection of Speed values messages.
Fig. 8: Injection of RPM messages.
"can0" represent the PID of the ECU that broadcasted the
message. The hexadecimal digits after the "#" character
comprise data within the CAN message.
Identification of PID of interest. Identifying the PID
of a set of CAN messages to the ECU of interest, such as
speedometer or tachometer, requires performing an action
related to the selected PID and collecting the resulting
messages exchanged over the CAN bus [44]. For example,
to identify the PID of the ECU responsible for the speed
reading, we accelerate and observe the resulting message
traffic.
To determine which PID triggers a desired action, we
used the record and replay of CAN messages technique [44]
to match the selected action to the appropriate PID.
Figure 6 shows the flowchart of the method. To identify, for
example, the PID corresponding to the tachometer reading
(Engine RPM), we push or release the accelerator and log
all the messages broadcasted over the CAN bus. Then, we
play back the log file to check if the tachometer reading
changes. Next, we divide the log into two halves and play
the first half of the log. We conclude that the PID of
concern is in the first half of the log if the tachometer
reading changes and in the second half of the log if the
tachometer does not change. We repeat the process until
6
(a) Relationship of the change of the
speed over time.
(b) Relationship of the change of the
RPM over time.
(c) Relationship between speed and
RPM.
Fig. 9: Plots of the speedometer and tachometer readings for the normal functioning scenario. (The sequence Ids
indicate the order of receiving the readings messages by our CAN Bus monitoring node.)
we identify the PID that causes the action. We applied
this technique to identify the PIDs for tachometer- and
speedometer-related ECUs on the Ford Transit 500 and
we found them to be 115 and 254 respectively.
Transformation of the data to human readable
values. Each ECU has a set of rules for storing the data
in the data field(s) of CAN messages. In this experiment,
we collected the physical data, e.g., the speed shown on
the speedometer, and the related messages that the given
ECU broadcasted [44]. The obtained data is used to infer





where Vdec is the real speed and Vhex is the hexadecimal
value contained in the message.
Inject fabricated messages into the CAN bus of the
vehicle. First, we construct a message that contains the
desired PID of the ECU and the data. We also construct
a log file with copies of the message. Then, we use the
canutil tool to replay the log file. Figure 7 shows the
effect of injecting speed reading messages with value 25
miles on the speedometer and Figure 8 shows the effect of
injecting RPM reading messages with value 120000 on the
tachometer of our test vehicle– the tachometer shows the
maximum value that it could display: 8000. We observed
that there is no time-stamp validity check performed
on the messages. However, the values must show some
increment else they are ignored. We also observed that
the vehicle ignores the injected messages and may show
engine faults in the dashboard if their frequency is low.
C. Data sets
The experiment consists of injecting speed (PID 254)
and RPM reading (PID 115) messages onto the CAN bus
from our CAN node simultaneously with the legitimate
6The multiplier 0.62137119 is used to convert km/h to MPH.
TABLE II: List of collected data sets.
No Description # of
CAN
messages
1 CAN Data for no injection of fabricated mes-
sages
23,963
2 CAN Data with injection of "FFF" as the
speed reading
88,492
3 CAN Data with injection of "FFFF" as the
RPM reading
30,308
ECU traffic. We collected logs of the CAN bus for three
scenarios:
1) No injection attack, or normal functioning of the
vehicle.
2) Injection of fabricated speed reading messages.
3) Injection of fabricated RPM reading messages.
Table II provides the size of the collected CAN bus log
for each of the three scenarios. Note that the RPM and
speed readings are time-series data. The legitimate values
and fabricated values are intertwined.
The data is available at: https://home.eng.iastate.edu/
~othmanel/files/CANData.zip - password "Ford6ransit".
Figure 9 shows the speed readings and RPM readings
over time under normal behavior The sequence ID indi-
cates the order of receiving the values by our monitoring
node from the CAN bus. Sub-figure (a) shows the change
of the speed over time. It shows that the driver accelerates
until they reached almost 30 MPH, then decelerates until
the vehicle is almost stopped. Sub-figure (b) shows the
change of the RPM reading over time. It shows that
the driver accelerated until the reading reached almost
2500. Then, they released the accelerator then accelerated
again, which we observe as drop followed by an increase
of the RPM readings. They repeated the two operations
two times and then released the accelerator. Sub-figure
(c) shows the relationship between the speedometer and
tachometer readings. The plot shows a strong relationship
between the two.
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(a) Frequency of the speed readings. (b) Frequency the of RPM readings.
Fig. 10: Frequencies of speedometer readings and tachometer readings for the normal functioning scenario (We used
speed steps as speed is almost continuous.)
(a) Frequency the speed readings. (b) Frequency of the RPM readings.
Fig. 11: Frequency of the speed readings for the scenario of injection of fabricated speed messages.
(a) Frequency the of speed readings. (b) Frequency of the RPM readings.
Fig. 12: Frequency of the readings for the scenario of injection of fabricated RPM messages.
8
(a) No fabricated messages attack. (b) Injection of fabricated RPM readingmessages
(c) Injection of fabricated speed reading
messages. (There is no correlation in this
case.)
Fig. 13: Correlations of the speed and RPM readings in the three scenarios. ()
Figure 10 shows the frequency of speed and RPM
readings under normal behavior (scenario 1). The plots do
not show special patterns. Figure 11 shows the frequencies
of speed and RPM readings for the scenarios of injection
of fabricated speed reading messages. The figure shows
two groups of values for speed readings: one group for
values close to 25 and one group for values between 0 and
15. Figure 12 shows the frequencies of speed and RPM
readings for the scenarios of injection of fabricated RPM
reading messages. Again, the figure shows two groups of
values: one group for values around 120000 and one group
for values around 1000. These values are in accordance
with the hexadecimal values that we injected: ’FFF’ for
speed reading and ’FFFF’ for RPM reading.
The next section discusses the use of three techniques to
discriminate the two states: no-attack and under-attack.
VI. Detection of message injection
This section discusses the use of Pearson correlation [25],
K-mean [26], and Hidden Markov Model [27] to detect
attacks through injection of fabricated RPM or speed
reading messages. Specifically, it reports about evaluating
the ability of these techniques to distinguish between no-
attack (when there is no injection of fabricated messages
in the CAN bus) and under-attack (when there is injection
of fabricated messages) states of a vehicle using data
values embedded in the RPM and speed reading messages
exchanged over the CAN bus. Recall that the unsuper-
vised machine learning methods do not require extensive
training phase to generate models that may depend on
contextual data. Example of context for CAN data include
behavior of the driver and make and model of the test
vehicle.
A. Detection using correlation
Almost each driving action, such as increase of speed,
requires the collaboration of a set of ECUs, which typically
results in a correlation between the data exchanged be-
tween the ECUs. For example, the engine RPM and speed





CAN Data for no injection of fabri-
cated messages
0.85 2.08e-204
CAN Data with injection of speed
readings
-0.013 0.45
CAN Data with injection of RPM
readings
0.33 9.37e-23
increase as the vehicle accelerates and decrease when there
is braking action, shifting of the transmission, or release of
the accelerator. The speed and RPM values must show a
strong positive relationship because, with the exception
of RPM spikes due to transmission downshifts during
deceleration, the engine RPM does not increase while the
speed is decreasing, and the speed does not drop while the
engine RPM is increasing. The relationship becomes weak
or no longer exists when data packets are injected to alter
the behavior of the speed or engine RPMs. Therefore, the
correlation of the data exchanged by the ECUs is high
when there is no-attack and small when there is attack.
We applied the Pearson correlation [25] to the data
collected from the three scenarios: legitimate messages,
injection of fabricated speed reading messages, and injec-
tion of fabricated RPM reading messages–see Section V-C.
Table III provides the correlation coefficients of the RPM
readings and speed readings for each of the three scenarios.
A detailed analysis of the correlation coefficients follows.
Figure 13 shows the plots of the correlation of the speed
and RPM readings for the three scenarios. Sub-figure
(a) shows the RPM readings as a function of the speed
readings and the linear regression line (orange) of the data
for the no injection of messages. The plot shows a strong
correlation between the two features; the coefficient is
0.8562 with p_value 2.08e−204. The results indicate that
the RPM reading predominately increases when the speed
reading increases. Sub-figure (b) shows the speed reading
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as a function of the RPM reading and the linear regression
line (orange) of the data for the injection of fabricated
RPM reading messages scenario. The plot shows a small
correlation between the two features; the coefficient is 0.33
with p_value 9.37e − 23. The results indicate that the
speed reading slightly increases when the RPM reading
increases. Sub-figure (c) shows the RPM reading as a
function of the speed reading and the linear regression line
(orange) of the data for the injection of fabricated speed
reading messages scenario. The plot shows no correlation
between the two features; the coefficient is -0.013 with
p_value 0.45. This correlation coefficient indicates that
the speed and RPM readings are unrelated.
The strength of the correlation coefficients distinguishes
the no injection attack and under injection attack states.
The results suggest that the technique can use the correla-
tion between the speed and RPM readings to distinguish
between no-attack state versus an under-attack state, i.e.,
there is no-attack when the correlation coefficient is high
and there is attack when the correlation coefficient is low.
As a result, we conclude that the Pearson correlation can
discriminate no-attack and under-attack states of a given
vehicle for the case of RPM readings and speed readings.
B. K-Means clustering
The k-means clustering is commonly used to group the
data points into a set of clusters; it clusters a given N
observations into a given k clusters, such that the total
Euclidean distances of the observations to the cluster
centers are minimized [26].
We applied the k-means clustering algorithm on the
data collected from the three scenarios: legitimate mes-
sages, injection of fabricated speed reading messages, and
injection of fabricated RPM reading messages–see Sec-
tion V-C–to cluster the observed speed (and RPM) read-
ings into two clusters (k is 2): no-attack and under-attack.
Note that we rescaled the data to be appropriate for k-
means algorithm. Table IV provides the performance of
the algorithm in identifying the injection attacks, in terms
of detection rate, false positive rate, and accuracy [47].
(Accuracy measures the fraction of correctly classified
cases [47].) A detailed analysis of the results obtained using
the algorithm follows.
Figure 14 plots the distinction between the no-attack
and under-attack states by the k-means clustering method
for the no injection of fabricated messages scenario. Sub-
figure (a) shows the two identified clusters from the RPM
readings. The algorithm falsely detects 64% of the RPM
readings messages as attacks while the dataset does not
include fabricated messages. Sub-figure (b) shows the two
identified clusters from the speed readings. The algorithm
falsely detects 68% of the speed readings messages as
attacks. We conclude that the technique is misleading
in this case because the dataset contains only legitimate
messages.
Figure 15 plots the distinction between the no-attack
and under-attack states by the k-means clustering method
for the injection of fabricated RPM reading messages sce-
nario. Sub-figure (a) shows the two identified clusters from
the RPM readings. The algorithm detects correctly only
71% of the injected readings messages and has an accuracy
of 0.71. Sub-figure (b) shows the two identified clusters
from the speed readings. The algorithm classified falsely
45% of speed readings messages as attack. The technique
has good performance in detecting RPM readings injection
but falsely detects injection of speed readings. Note that
we observe in the figure that there are two types of lines:
curved line and straight line. The straight line plots the
injected constant reshaped digital value of "FFFF" into
the RPM readings.
Figure 16 plots the distinction between the no-attack
and under-attack states by the k-means clustering method
for the injection of fabricated speed reading messages
scenario. Sub-figure (a) shows the two identified clusters.
The algorithm falsely detects 50% of the RPM readings
messages as attacks. Sub-figure (b) shows the two identi-
fied clusters of speed readings. The algorithm detects 79%
of the injected speed readings messages, with accuracy of
0.79. Note that we observe in the figure that there are two
types of lines: curved lines and straight lines. The straight
line plots the injected constant reshaped digital value of
"FFF" into the speed readings.
C. Detection Using Hidden Markov Model
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a doubly stochastic
process where a stochastic process is not directly ob-
servable but can be inferred through another observable
process. The model is named "hidden" since the state of
the model at a time instant t is not directly observable
[27]. However, each of these hidden states could be asso-
ciated with a set of observations of the related observable
processes.
We used HMMlearn [48], the python implementation of
HMM, to train a model, using two-thirds of each of the
datasets (see Section V-C), to predict whether the message
data indicates normal behavior or a vehicle under-attack.
The remaining third of each dataset is used to verify the
accuracy of the model’s predictions. Table V provides the
performance of the algorithm in identifying the injection
attacks, in terms of detection rate, false positive rate,
accuracy and precision [47]. A detailed analysis of the
results obtained using the algorithm follows.
Figure 17 plots the RPM and speed readings under
normal behavior or the no-attack scenario. Sub-figure (a)
shows that the method classified all the RPM readings cor-
rectly as being legitimate. However, sub-figure (b) shows
that the method classified the speed readings into both
no-attack and under-attack states as indicated by the
gap in speeds from approximately 18 MPH to 30 MPH.
The algorithm classified falsely 42.5% of speed readings
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TABLE IV: Performance of the k-means clustering to detect injection attacks.










CAN Data for no injection of fabricated mes-
sages
0.0 0.68 0.0 0.0 0.64 0.0
CAN Data with injection of RPM reading 0.0 0.45 0.0 0.71 0.0 0.71
CAN Data with injection of speed reading 0.79 0.0 0.79 0.0 0.50 0.0
(a) Based on RPM readings. (b) Based on speed readings.
Fig. 14: Identification of attack/no-attack states for the no injection of fabricated messages scenario based on K-means
clustering.
(a) Based on RPM readings. (b) Based on speed readings.
Fig. 15: Identification of attack/no-attack states for the injection of fabricated RPM messages scenario based on K-
means clustering.
TABLE V: Performance of the HMM clustering to detect injection attacks.










CAN Data for no injection of fabricated mes-
sages
0.0 0.425 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CAN Data with injection of RPM reading 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.68 0.08 0.75
CAN Data with injection of speed reading 0.80 0.0 0.80 0.0 0.0 0.0
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(a) Based on RPM readings. (b) Based on speed readings.
Fig. 16: Identification of attack/no-attack states for the injection of fabricated speed messages scenario based on K-
means clustering.
(a) Based on RPM readings (b) Based on speed readings
Fig. 17: Identification of attack/no-attack states for the no injection of fabricated messages scenario based on HMM.
(a) Based on RPM readings (b) Based on speed readings
Fig. 18: Identification of attack/no-attack states for the injection of fabricated speed messages scenario based on HMM.
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(a) Based on RPM readings (b) Based on speed readings
Fig. 19: Identification of attack/no-attack states for the injection of fabricated RPM messages scenario based on HMM
messages as attack, while the dataset does not include
fabricated messages.
Figure 18 plots the distinction between the no-attack
and under-attack states by the HMM clustering method
for the injection of fabricated speed reading messages
scenario. According to Sub-figure (a), the algorithm did
not identify an attack from the RPM readings and ac-
cording to sub-figure (b) the method identified an attack
from the speed readings. The detection rate of fabricated
speed readings messages is 80% with accuracy of 0.8.
The technique succeeds, with acceptable rate, in this case
because the dataset includes fabricated speed messages
but does not include fabricated RPM readings.
Figure 19 plots the distinction between the no-attack
and under-attack states by the HMM clustering method
for the injection of fabricated RPM reading messages
scenario. According to sub-figure (a), the method iden-
tified an attack from the RPM readings and according
to sub-figure (b) the method did not identify an attack
from the speed readings. The detection rate of fabricated
RPM readings messages is 68% and false detection rate
is 8%, with accuracy of 0.75. The technique has good
performance in this case because the dataset includes
fabricated RPM messages but does not include fabricated
speed readings.
The HMM technique distinguishes no-attack and attack
states when there is an attack with acceptable accuracy
but has high positive rate in detecting attacks from speed
readings data when there is no-attack.
VII. Discussion
Table VI shows the common data sources that have been
used to assess the performance of machine learning tech-
niques in identifying attacks on CAN bus. Unlike reported
studies, the data source of this study is the log of a CAN
bus of an in-motion vehicle under fabricated messages
injection attack. The results suggest that studying CAN
bus traffic anomaly detection techniques using dataset
fabricated via simulators, models and similar off-vehicle
test facilities may not properly evaluate the performance
of the detection techniques, which was already suggested,
but not demonstrated, by Tomlinson et al. [22]. Thus, re-
searchers should use data directly captured from the CAN
bus of operational vehicles to evaluate the effectiveness of
anomaly detection techniques on the CAN bus.
TABLE VI: Examples of reported performance of CAN
bus IDS approaches.
Ref. Data source Detection
rate
[19] Use data of own devices connected to vehi-
cles
100%
[20] Use synthetic (artificial) data 100%
[21] Use data collected from simulators up to
100%
[38] Use data from stationary vehicle up to
98%
[24] Use data from in-motion vehicles See
Table VII
The application of the Pearson correlation [25] using
the collected datasets revealed that the correlation dis-
tinguishes under-attack and no-attack states of a given
vehicle for the case of speed and RPM readings. This
confirms the proposition that the relationships between
messages exchanged by the ECUs through the CAN bus of
vehicles can be used to detect cyber-attacks on connected
vehicles [17]. The results suggest that knowledge should be
ascertained concerning the relationships and collaboration
between a vehicle’s ECUs to detect anomalous behaviors.
The k-means clustering [26] has limited capabilities to
distinguish the under-attack and no-attack states of a
vehicle using the speed and RPM readings. The method
has an acceptable detection rate (and accuracy) but also
a high positive rate (almost 0.5). The results indicate that
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the method is not appropriate for time-series data, such
as the speed and RPM readings.
The HMM [27] has acceptable performance to distin-
guish the under-attack and no-attack states of a vehicle
using the speed and RPM readings. The method has,
however, high positive rate in detecting attacks from speed
readings when there is no-attack. In practice, this issue
may be mitigated by using the method in conjunction with
the Pearson correlation.
TABLE VII: Performance of K-means and HMM com-




Detection of cyclic messages injection in
stationary vehicle using Supplier’s B IDS
.5
Detection of cyclic messages injection in




Detection of cyclic messages injection in
stationary vehicle using Supplier’s C IDS
.67
Detection of cyclic messages injection in




Detection of RPM reading messages in in-
motion vehicle using K-means clustering
.71
Detection of speed reading messages in
in-motion vehicle using K-means cluster-
ing
.79
HMM Detection of RPM reading messages in in-motion vehicle using HMM
.80
Detection of speed reading messages in
in-motion vehicle using HMM
.75
Table VII compares the accuracy of the unsupervised
machine learning techniques that we used, k-means and
HMM, and two pre-commercial IDS [24] in detecting
fabricated messages attacks on CAN bus. Our study and
the one reported in [24] used different datasets captured
from in-motion vehicles but include messages of different
cyclic CAN IDs. The accuracy metric shows that the k-
means and HMM have performance comparable to the
ones of supervised machine learning techniques. Note that
the IDS discussed in [24] has accuracy 1.0 for in-motion
vehicle and 0.5 for stationary vehicle but we do not have
results for stationary vehicles–the speed reading is 0 for
stationary vehicle.
Note that we used in this study three datasets related
to one driver and one vehicle. This may limit the general-
ization of the results.
VIII. Conclusion
Many studies in the last decade have shown the feasibil-
ity of cyber-attacks on connected vehicles. The community
has proposed solutions to prevent such attacks, which
require modification of the CAN protocol. The anomaly
detection technique has been proposed as an alternative
approach as it does not require modification to the CAN
protocol. This study found that the Pearson correlation
can be used to detect attacks, the k-means clustering
fails to detect attacks, and HMM provides acceptable
results in detecting injection of fabricated speed and
RPM reading messages. The results suggests that studying
anomaly detection techniques for the CAN bus using
datasets fabricated via simulators, models and similar off-
vehicle test facilities–which is the current practice in the
literature–does not indicate the performance of the detec-
tion techniques. We suggest that researchers should use
real data obtained from operational vehicles in evaluating
the efficacy of anomaly detection techniques in the CAN
bus. In addition, the results suggest that unsupervised
machine learning techniques such as HMM could provide
performance in detecting attacks comparable to supervised
machine learning technique when using data from in-
motion vehicle. These methods do not require an extensive
training phase to develop models that are tight to the
vehicle make and model or to the driving habit of the
driver. The results suggest also that knowledge should be
ascertained concerning the relationships and collaboration
between a vehicle’s ECUs to detect anomalous behaviors.
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